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Daniel Byers. Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription
in the Second World War. Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 2016. Pp. xviii + 324.
Most students of Canada’s participation in the Second World War
will be aware that our army overseas was comprised primarily of
volunteers, but that conscripts had to be sent to Europe late in the
war due to higher-than-expected casualties after the Allied invasion
of France. Nothing more than the title of The Conscription Crisis of
1944, a classic from 1961,1 is needed to indicate how momentous this
decision was at the time, not only for the army but for the nation
as a whole. But the title of that book, or the exasperated outburst
by Minister of Munitions and Supply C.D. Howe at the height of the
cabinet debates on the subject, “Conscription or no Conscription,
but for God’s sake let us make up our minds” (quoted on p. 228),
can lead to the impression that conscription was only introduced in
1944. However, with initial training lasting four months in basic and
advanced training centres, pulling men off the streets in November
of 1944 was not going to meet the army’s immediate need for
reinforcements.
Nevertheless, the government was able to order the immediate
dispatch of 16,000 trained personnel because conscription already
existed in Canada, and had done so since the passage in 1940 of the
National Resources Mobilization Act, or NRMA. These NRMA men,
of whom almost 160,000 were to serve during the war, formed an army

R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1961).

1  
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parallel to, and in many ways separate from, the volunteer army.
Daniel Byers, associate professor of history at Laurentian University,
has chosen to refer to them as a “zombie army,” in reference to the
ubiquitous contemporary nickname for the conscripts inspired by the
unthinking automatons of films of the 1930s. The NRMA originally
forbade conscripts from serving overseas, therefore most of them were
assigned to home defence units, but in 1942, during the so-called
“first conscription crisis,” the geographic limitation contained in the
act was lifted after a national plebiscite.2 After that, conscripts were
posted further and further afield in the Western Hemisphere, including
participation in the U.S.-led invasion of Kiska in the Aleutians, until
the decision was finally taken to use them in Europe.
Canadian conscription in the Second World War has formed the
subject matter, in whole or in part, of a number of fine monographs
and articles in the decades since 1945.3 As Byers points out in his
introduction, however, these have directed their attention mainly to
the political wrangling surrounding the decision to send conscripts
to Europe as reinforcements, as well as to the related question of
whether the pressure exerted by many in the army’s hierarchy in
favour of doing so constituted a “revolt of the generals.” In Zombie
Army, the focus is primarily on the workings of the nationwide
system of conscription set up under the NRMA and the experiences
of the conscripts once they entered that system. It is certainly the
first monograph that can make that claim, and as such represents a
major contribution to the historiography of this subject. In addition,
however, constituting a second emphasis almost as important as the
first, Byers has chosen to re-examine the high-level deliberations and
debates on conscription, not only in late 1944 but throughout the
war, through the lens of the NRMA, revealing the ways in which the
presence of tens of thousands of trained personnel at home affected
decisions regarding the volunteer army overseas. This two-pronged
approach has allowed Byers to produce by far the most complete

2  
It was at this time that Prime Minister Mackenzie King uttered his famous
statement, “not necessarily conscription, but conscription if necessary” (quoted on p.
109); once again giving the impression that conscription in Canada did not yet exist.
3  
Mostly in part, as far as monographs are concerned: besides Dawson, the only other
book that I am aware of that deals exclusively with this subject is J.L. Granatstein’s
Conscription in the Second World War: A Study in Political Management (Toronto:
Ryerson Press, 1969), which does not, however, exceed eighty-five pages of main text.
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account to date of conscription in Canada during the Second World
War.
After a brief introduction, the first chapter gives an overview of
Canadian conscription up to 1939, focusing primarily on the First
World War, providing essential context for the extreme reluctance of
the Mackenzie King government to send conscripts overseas during
the second. Of the seven remaining chapters, some deal with the
NRMA, others deal with policy planning for the army overseas, and
some discuss both. With respect to the NRMA, the author’s sources
are primarily archival—including a complete reading of the war
diaries of all the basic training centres for the period 1940-42—but he
has also included material drawn from novels, memoirs, and letters
written by former conscripts, oral histories, and even some interviews
to provide first-hand accounts. We learn that conscription began as
a universal programme of thirty-day training camps set up across
the country, but the limited military usefulness of this scheme led to
the decision to increase the training period to four months, thereby
aligning it with the programme for volunteers for overseas service.
With volunteers and conscripts training side by side, many NRMA
men decided to “go active,” but for those that did not, a combination
of blandishments and threats were often employed to get them to
change their minds. Some of this included verbal and even physical
abuse;4 one case, in which a conscript was beaten unconscious, led to
a formal court of inquiry.
In those parts of the book dealing with manpower planning,
Byers writes for the beginner, providing a great deal of background
to bring the reader new to the subject up to speed. There is no
need to reinvent the wheel here, and so the author relies primarily
upon published secondary accounts, some of them decades old, for
this purpose. But when he comes to discussing the importance of
the NRMA in the planning of policy for the overseas divisions, his
sources are almost exclusively archival, including the minutes of the
Cabinet War Committee and the Mackenzie King diaries. He explains
that in the early days conscription allowed the army to release

4  
The methods described here are reminiscent of the treatment meted out during
the First World War to conscientious objectors whose requests for exemption were
denied; see Amy J. Shaw, Crisis of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in Canada
during the First World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009),
89-97 for the worst examples.
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members of the militia, who had been mobilised for the protection of
key infrastructure, back to their civilian employment. As increasing
numbers of conscripts were assigned to home defence duties, more and
more volunteers for the “Active” army were able to be released from
these units and sent overseas. Moreover, voluntarism was high at first
among the NRMA men, but as early as 1943 it was becoming clear
that the supply of volunteers for overseas service, whether conscripted
first or not, would soon be exhausted. By this time, what Byers refers
to as the “big army” of five divisions in Europe was already in place,
the planning for which, much earlier in the war, had been based on
overly optimistic estimates of the capacity of the voluntary system
to fill its ranks. Action in Sicily, Italy, and northwest Europe quickly
demonstrated that the army’s casualty estimates were also overly
optimistic, and before the end of 1944 the prime minister was forced
to repudiate his 1939 promise to the country that conscription would
not be imposed for service overseas.5
Events after the decision to send conscripts to Europe are treated
in an epilogue. There it is explained that, with almost all of those
in the country willing to volunteer having done so by late 1944, the
ranks of the conscripted at that stage were comprised primarily of
those most adamant in their refusal to serve overseas. The news of
the government’s decision to employ conscripts as reinforcements was
greeted in some cases by protest marches and sit-down strikes—
technically, a state of mutiny—by conscripts on home defence duties.
Photos from these incidents grace the front and back covers of the
book. Of the 16,000 conscripts earmarked as reinforcements, over onequarter never made it to the troopships, having absented themselves
in transit. Of the 9,667 who reached the front, two-thirds did so
after hostilities had ended. Only 2,463 served in operational units, of
whom 232 were wounded, 69 were killed, and 13 taken prisoner.
As I have come to expect from the books in the Studies in
Canadian Military History series from UBC Press and the Canadian
War Museum, the standard of production is very high, with virtually
no typographical errors. A very helpful aid to the reader is the full
text of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, printed as
an appendix. It should be pointed out that there is no bibliography,
with sources cited in full only on first appearance in the 63 pages
“So long as this government may be in power, no such measure will be enacted”
(quoted on p. 34).
5  
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of endnotes. A more substantive omission from this study is an
examination of the experiences of those conscripts that eventually
made it to the front lines. With a subtitle of The Canadian Army
and Conscription in the Second World War, I certainly expected a
more serious treatment of that topic than the one and a half pages
devoted to it in the epilogue. Although Byers assures us that “there is
very little evidence with which to asses their [the conscripts’] combat
performance” (p. 237), Patrick Dennis’s new Reluctant Warriors,
examining the role of Canadian conscripts during the “Hundred
Days” offensive of 1918,6 suggests that more could be done. But
Dennis’s book, as well as a number of other recent monographs on
specialised aspects of manpower in the First World War, suggests
that the time may have passed when it would have been reasonable
to expect the whole story in one volume with respect to conscription
in the Second World War. In any case, there is a certain justice in
ending the narrative where Byers did. Once the NRMA men made
it to Europe, the policy was to break them up and send them to the
front as anonymously as possible. Serving as individuals alongside
members of the volunteer army, where they would “stand, or fall . . .
on how they prove themselves as soldiers,”7 by no means did they any
longer constitute a “zombie army.”
brian bertosa , independent researcher

Patrick M. Dennis, Reluctant Warriors: Canadian Conscripts and the Great War
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017).
7  
General H.D.G. Crerar, commander, First Canadian Army, quoted on p. 236.
6  
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